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Hostile-Audience Confrontations: Police Conduct and First 
Amendment Rights 
For nearly thirty-five years, courts have vainly attempted to 
reconcile the first amendment rights of a speaker to communicate 
provocative, unpopular messages to the public with the interest of 
the state in preventing violence that might be precipitated by the com-
munication.1 In view of the failure of the courts in this area to 
overcome what are admittedly formidable practical and theoretical 
difficulties, it is understandable that police departments in major 
cities have not adequately formulated procedures to deal with hos-
tile-audience confrontations.2 Departmental regulations currently 
either fail to reconcile properly the important individual and state 
interests involved or are framed so vaguely that they provide no 
real guidance to patrol officers on the limits of police interference 
with the exercise of first amendment rights. 3 Yet it is the local law-
enforcement official who must make the on-the-spot decision of 
whether to silence a speaker confronted with a hostile audience. 
This Note first suggests an explicit standard for police conduct 
in the hostile-audience situation that defines procedures the police 
must follow at various stages to avoid violating the first amendment. 
The standard reflects the fact that first amendment free speech 
rights are not absolute and that such rights must be weighed against 
both compelling state interests4 and the competing constitutional 
1. While the Supreme Court recognizes the duty of the government to afford 
police protection for the exercise of first amendment rights, it has not clarified the 
limits of this duty. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
342 (1970). A recent Supreme Court case that involved a classic hostile-audience 
problem was Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969). Eighty-five peaceful 
marchers attracted a crowd of over 1000 spectators who became riotous despite the 
crowd control efforts of one hundred uniformed police officers. When the demon-
strators refused to disperse, they were charged and later convicted of disorderly con-
duct. For a discussion of the lower court's analysis, see note 8 infra. The Supreme 
Court's majority opinion, without commenting on the hostile audience issue, over-
turned the disorderly conduct conviction on grounds of lack of evidence and an er-
roneous jury charge. 
2. This Note does not attempt to survey the practices of police departments in 
a cross section of American cities. Questionnaires were sent only to major metro-
politan police forces, with the following responding: Berkeley, California; Boston, 
Massachusetts; Detroit, Michigan; Kansas City, Missouri; Miami, Florida; New York, 
New York. 
3. For typical police guidelines, see authorities cited notes 29, 32-33 infra. 
4. If a constitutional right is abridged by state action, the state must assert a 
compelling regulatory interest. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562 (1965) 
(state's strong regulatory interest in protecting the judiciary); Cox v. New Hamp• 
shire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) (state's authority to protect public safety through 
parade permit ordinances). See also Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 
VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1038-39 (1969). 
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claims of other persons. 5 It seeks to reconcile the interest in public 
order with our constitutional commitment to open discussion and 
robust debate.6 Finally, to deter police abuse of first amendment 
rights in the hostile-audience context, reforms of tort law are suggested 
that provide redress for speakers who have been wrongly silenced. 
I. STANDARD FOR POLICE CONDUCT IN THE 
HOSTILE-AUDIENCE SITUATION 
The proposed standard for police practices in the hostile-audience 
context is as follow$: 
A. Police may limit otherwise lawfuF speech-
( 1) only if there is a clear and present danger of imminent 
violence; and 
(2) not on the basis of (a) the character of the speech 
or (b) the intent of the speaker to arouse audience 
hostility. 
B. The police may order the speaker to depart only-
( l) after the police have made all reasonable efforts (a) 
5. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (substantial privacy 
interests must be invaded in an intolerable manner). 
6. The opportunity for free political discussion is a basic tenet of a democratic 
society. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), where the 
Supreme Court in overturning a libel conviction of the New York Times stated: 
"[W]e consider this case against the background of a profound national commit-
ment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unplea-
santly sharp attacks on government and public officials." 376 U.S. at 270. 
7. Although such factors as advocacy of unlawful conduct or inappropriateness 
of the time, place or manner of the speech activity may provide a basis for the 
termination of speech, it will be assumed that the speech is otherwise lawful for 
the purpose of focusing upon the issue of when speech activities may be limited 
solely because of audience hostility. 
Time, place, and manner concerns are only explicitly considered by the standard 
to the extent that these factors contribute to audience hostility. Thus, the standard 
deals only with situations in which the time, place, and manner of speech have been 
approved by appropriate agencies but, notwithstanding this approval, a hostile audi-
ence appears. State power to regulate the time, place, and manner of public assem-
blies is well established. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); 
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). The right of landowners to invoke trespass 
laws and thereby curtail assemblies held on land dedicated to private use is also 
settled. See T. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 307. However, private owners possessing 
land open to public use may be limited in their discretion to invoke trespass ordi-
nances. See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union •Local 590 v. Logan Valley 
Plaza, 391 U.S. 309 (1968); Marsh' v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). But see 
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 
(1972). 
It should be noted that the hostile-audience standard would be meaningless if 
it provided that the police could either arbitrarily determine the inappropriateness 
of an assembly's time, place or manner or unilaterally invoke trespass ordinances. 
That amount of discretion would subject the rights of all parties to the whim of 
the police. 
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to control the spectator audience and (b) to order 
the audience to disperse; 
(2) the order to the speaker to depart has been explained; 
and 
(3) safe escort has been offered to the speaker, with the 
permissible exception that time constraints may make 
the tendering of such an offer impossible. 
C. Safe escort must be provided to a .speaker ordered to depart. 
D. Jif the speaker departs within reasonable time he may 
not be charged with any offense incidental to the events 
of the otherwise lawful assembly. 
E. If the speaker fails to depart within a reasonable time, 
he maybe-
( 1) subject to immediate removal by. the police; and 
(2) subject to sanctions for noncompliance with the order 
,to depart. 8 
A. Limitations on Lawful Speech 
In reconciling the competing interests of public safety and free 
speech in a hostile-audience context, the courts have relied heavily 
upon variations of the clear and present danger doctrine. 0 The 
earliest Supreme Court case that considered an explicit hostile-
audience situation was Cantwell v. Connecticut.10 In that case, 
a Jehovah's Witness who aroused the anger of a group of Roman 
Catholics by playing a phonograph record containing verbal at-
tacks on Catholicism was convicted of the common-law offense of 
breach of the peace. The Supreme Court held that, although the 
8. This standard is similar to the construction that the Illinois Supreme Court 
gave to a disorderly conduct ordinance, CHICAGO, ILL. MUNICIPAL CODE § 193-l(d) 
(1972), in City of Chicago v. Gregory, 39 Ill. 2d 47, 233 N.E.2d 422 (1968), revd. 
on other grounds, 394 U.S. 111 (1969). See note 1 supra. In interpreting the 
ordinance and affirming the convictions of peaceful demonstrators charged with dis• 
orderly conduct for the hostile, uncontrollable reaction of their audience, the Illinois 
State Supreme Court stated: "It is only where there is an imminent threat of vio-
lence, the police have made all reasonable efforts to protect the demonstrators, the 
police have requested that the demonstration be stopped and explained the request, 
if there be time, and there is a refusal of the police request, that an arrest for 
an otherwise lawful demonstration may be made." 39 Ill. 2d at 60, 233 N.E.2d 
at 429. 
While the Illinois Supreme Court's construction is similar to the hostile audience 
standard proposed by this Note, it does not provide support for the proposed stand-
ard's constitutionality. The United States Supreme Court's reversal in Gregory did 
not reach this issue. See note 1 supra. Interestingly, when the Chicago disorderly 
conduct ordinance was redrafted after the United States Supreme Court's reversal of 
Gregory, little of the Illinois state supreme court's construction was incorporated by 
the drafters. See note 88 infra. 
9. The clear and present danger test was first stated in Schenck v. United States, 
249 U.S. 47 (1919). See generally T. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 312-28. 
10. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
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contents of the record aroused animosity, the communication, con-
sidered in the light of constitutional guarantees, raised no clear and 
present menace to public peace and order.11 In overturning the 
conviction, the Court discussed the proper balance between public 
safety and free expression: · "[B]reach of the peace embraces ... 
not only violent acts but acts and words likely to produce violence in 
others. . . . When the clear and present danger of riot, disorder, 
interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate 
threat to public safety, peace, or order appears, the power of the 
State to prevent or punish [speech] is obvious."12 
While the Cantwell case did not explicitly use the proposed stand-
ard's "imminent violence" terminology, imminent violence certainly 
connotes the immediate threat of serious harm with which the Court 
in Cantwell was concerned. Unfortunately, subsequent Supreme 
Court decisi<;>ns have avoided a direct consideration and elabora-
tion of the scope of free speech rights in the hostile-audience con-
text, for the Court's decisions have rested on such narrow grounds 
as improper jury instructions, 13 overbroad statutes, 14 or an over broad 
grant of administrative discretion tantamount to prior restraint.15 
Yet the common thread of concern for the state's interests in pre-
venting violence is nonetheless evident. Many cases that have arti-
culated justifications for police termination of speech activities have 
identified the critical factor in terms such as "public danger, actual or 
impending,"16 or "serious substantive evil that rises far above public 
11. 310 U.S. at 296. 
12. 310 U.S. at 308; see Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951), which, 
in upholding a hostile audience speaker's disorderly conduct conviction, relied in part 
on this passage quoted from Cantwell. Cf. Note, Protecting Demonstrators 
from Hostile Audiences, 19 KAN. L. REv. 524, 530 (1971) (condemning the "heck-
lers' veto" but concluding that "although free speech would be suppressed, dispersal 
of the demonstrators is certainly preferable to a bloodbath .... "); Note, Free 
Speech and the Hostile Audience, 26 N.Y.U. L. REv. 489 (1951) (speakers can 
be dispersed by police when bloodshed is imminent). But see A. MEIKLE.JOHN, FREE 
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 91 (1st ed. 1948) (''The un-
abridged freedom of public discussion is the rock on which our government stands. 
With that foundation beneath us, we shall not flinch in the face of any clear and 
present--or, even, terrific--danger"). 
13. E.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969), discussed in note 
l supra; Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). 
14. E.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). 
15. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951). 
16. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1944). Cf. In re Brown, 9 
Cal. 3d 612, 510 P.2d 1017, 108 Cal. Rptr .. 465 (1973), which, in overturning the 
convictions of students arrested in a boisterous college demonstration, stated: "Al-
though the public may fear a large, noisy assembly, particularly an assembly that 
espouses an unpopular idea, such an apprehension does not warrant restraints on 
the right to assemble unless the apprehension is justifiable and reasonable and the 
assembly poses a threat of violence." 9 Cal. 3d at 623, 510 P.2d at 1024, 108 
Cal. Rptr. at 472. 
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inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest."17 Thus, the use of a hostile-
audience standard that employs the clear and present danger of im-
minent violence as a point of departure in reconciling the state in-
terests in protecting lives and property and the countervailing interests 
of free speech seems appropriate. 
The proposed standard expressly ·rejects the use of two addi-
tional criteria that have frequently been suggested as justifications 
for terminating speech activities: character of the speech and intent 
of the speaker. As for the first, although certain classes of speech 
have been defined that do not merit first . amendment protections, 18 
the courts have repeatedly held that the voicing of unpopular views 
does not justify silencing a speaker.19 As Justice Douglas made clear 
in Terminiello v. Chicago, "a function of free speech under our sys-
tem of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its 
high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfac-
tion with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger."20 
The first amendment obviously was not conceived to protect only those 
views with which others agree. Although unpopular views may 
contribute significantly, or in fact may be the sole cause of audience 
hostility, the expression of such views, by itself, is not a constitu-
tionally permissible criterion for terminating speech. 21 
17. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). See also Edwards v. South 
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), a civil rights case which, in overturning the disorderly 
conduct convictions of peaceful demonstrators, summarized the spectators' mood and 
distinguished it from the more serious situation arising in Feiner v. New York, 340 
U.S. 315 (1951) (discussed in note 12 supra): "This therefore was a far cry from the 
situation in Feiner v. New York, where two policemen were faced with a crowd 
which was 'pushing, shoving and milling around,' where at least one member of 
the crowd 'threatened violence if the police did not act,' where 'the crowd was press-
ing closer around [the speaker] and the officer,' and where 'the speaker passes the 
bounds of agreement or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot.'" 372 U.S. 
at 236 (citations omitted). 
18. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942), originally form-
ulated the "fighting words" doctrine and with it the theory that some speech is of 
such low value so as not to merit first amendment protection: ''There are certain 
well defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment 
of which have never been thought to raise any constitutional problem. These include 
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting words.'" 
315 U.S. at 571-72. Incitement to riot also falls outside of the first amendment's 
protection. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
19. E.g., Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 570 (1970), which overturned 
picketers' disorderly conduct convictions holding: "[O]n this record, we find that 
petitioners may have been found guilty of violating (the disorderly conduct ordi-
nance) simply because they advocated unpopular ideas. Since conviction on this 
ground would violate the Constitution, it is our duty to set aside petitioners convic-
tions." 397 U.S. at 570; Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); 
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). But cf. Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 
594 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); Blackwell v. Issaquena Coun-
ty Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966). 
20. 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). 
21. See, e.g., Bacbellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970). A case that seems 
to suggest a contrary position is Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), 
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The second suggested, but inappropriate, justification for the 
termination of speech is the intent of the speaker to arouse audience 
hostility.22 Although this use of speaker intent would have the 
merit of punishing culpable troublemakers, a hostile-audience stand-
ard incorporating speaker intent as a criterion for silencing speech has 
several substantial defects. Police officers at the scene can hardly 
be expected to draw fine distinctions between such permissible 
motives as explicit confrontation with an audience known to harbor 
antithtical views23 or generation of mass media interest, 24 and such 
an impermissible motive as inciting the audience to violence. 
The difficulty of discerning impermissible intent in the exercise 
of first amendment rights is manifest in the Supreme Court cases 
dealing with the advocacy of unlawful conduct. 25 In Brandenburg 
v. Ohio, 26 the most recent in this line of cases, the Supreme Court 
overturned the conviction of the leader of a Klu Klux Klan group 
under an Ohio criminal syndicalism statute. A close reading of 
this case suggests that a showing of explicit advocacy "directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action"27 has now been made 
necessary because of the extreme difficulties inherent in discerning 
actual, unlawful intent of the speaker to foment unlawful conduct. 
In the context of a hostile-audience confrontation, where such 
in which the court upheld a statute declaring it illegal to address "any offensive, 
derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any . . . public 
place." However, a close reading of Chaplinsky reveals that the application of this 
"fighting words" doctrine is restricted to face-to-face confrontations. The rationale 
of Chaplinsky has not been, and should not be, extended to situations where a general 
audience is addressed. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973); Lewis v. 
City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 
611, 613 n.3 (1971). For a discussion of this issue, see Note, 19 KAN. L. REV. 524, 
supra note 12, at 526-27, and Note, 26 N.Y.U. L. REv. 489, supra note 12, at 
497-99. 
22. See generally Note, Freedom of Speech and Assembly: The Problem of the 
Hostile Audience, 49 CoLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1949). 
23. The importance of self-expression was explicitly recognized in Police Dept. 
of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972), a picketing decision 
where the Court stated that "[t]o permit the continued building of our politics and 
culture, and to assure self fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed 
the right to express any thought, free from government censorship." 
Professor Meiklejohn comments that "the public freedom of speech requires that 
all speakers have a chance to reach [their audience]." A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREEDOM 
AND TIIE PUBLIC 112 (1965). 
24. Since many persons cannot afford the expense of purchasing time on mass 
media networks or do not have access through "letters to the editor," often the only 
available method of gaining publicity is to create a newsworthy event such as a 
demonstration. See generally Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amend-
ment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967). 
25. Cf. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 
341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
26. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
27. 395 U.S. at 447. See Comment, "Brandenburg v. Ohio": A Speech Test 
for All Seasons, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 151 (1976). 
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an external manifestation of intent as specific advocacy of unlawful 
conduct does not exist, intent becomes too indefinite and subjective 
a criterion on which to predicate speech rights. Given the diffi-
culties that courts have had in identifying unlawful intent, it is clear 
that such a standard would be applied inconsistently and capriciously 
by the police officer on the street. There is, for example, too great 
. a likelihood that the police would claim unlawful intent whenever 
speech activities engendered a strongly negative reaction from a 
crowd or from policemen themselves. To allow termination of speech 
on these grounds would establish "a simple and readily available 
technique by which cities and states [could] with impunity subject 
all speeches . . . to the . . . censorship of the local police. 28 
Police department regulations, despite the availability of some 
guidance from the courts, fail to define precisely when a dispersal 
order is justified in a hostile-audience situation. This failure, when 
combined with built-in police biases against the speaker, threatens 
first amendment rights. This Note suggests that the "imminent 
violence" test is appropriate and feasible for triggering a dispersal 
order, provided that other procedures required by the standard (e.g., 
reasonable efforts to control audience) have been followed. 
It is fair to say that current police procedures do, at least, 
comport with constitutional limitations upon the use of speech. 
character and speaker intent. Police manuals thus urge caution in 
making arrests even for such constitutionally unprotected speech as 
"fighting words,"29 or incitement to riot.30 The New York Police 
Department, for example, instructs officers that "[y]our job is to 
protect all . . . speakers even if you find their views wrong, per-
verted, disloyal, or disgusting."31 Moreover, speaker intent is not 
enumerated as one of the proper grounds for dispersal, and to this 
extent the police regulations counsel a proper respect for first amend-
28. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 323 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting). 
29. See POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF NEW YoRK, GUIDELINES FOR DEMON-
STRATIONS 8 (undated) (hereinafter NEW YORK GUIDELINES): "It is not yet defi-
nitely settled whether [a New York verbal harassment law] can apply to abuse of 
policemen in demonstration situations." 
30. See id. at 9, which carefully interprets New York's riot act for policemen: 
The persons to whom the speaker is talking must be called upon to do some-
thing, to take action. There is no incitement to riot where the crowd is stirred 
up and made angry by a speaker who merely states his beliefs or facts (true or 
false doesn't matter). For example, it may be incitement to shout to the crowd 
"let's go right now and bum down the comer liquor store," but it is not incite-
ment to state facts about or an opinion concerning the liquor store owner which 
makes the listeners furious and thus possibly likely to resort to violence. 
See also Letter from Wesley A. Pomeroy, Chief of Police, Berkeley Police Depart-
ment, Berkeley, California, to author, October 3, 1975 (on file at Michigan Law 
Review) (hereinafter Berkeley Letter): "Caution and judgment govern actions 
directed toward inciteful speakers: the use of powers of arrest or protective custody 
would depend exclusively on the attendant circumstances." 
31, NEW YORK GUIDELINES, supra note 29, at 7. 
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ment rights. It is unfortunate, however, that the regulations do not 
explicitly caution that the audience hostility generated by the speaker's 
views neither lessens the duty of the police to provide protection for 
the speaker nor provides, by itself, sufficient grounds for terminat-
ing speech. 
A major defect in police regulations is that they do not clarify 
the level of danger to public order needed to trigger dispersal or 
arrest of speakers or of members of the audience. Some focus on 
the duty of police to act wh~n there is actual violence and ignore the 
question of "imminent violence." Others, such as the New York City 
Police crowd control manual, state only that police department at-
torneys must advise the officers at the scene whether speech should 
be terminated. 32 The Boston Police procedures are similarly defi-
cient in addressing the imminent violence issue and merely suggest 
that when police are confronted by a hostile-audience situation, ( 1) 
other police should be summoned immediately, and (2) the crowd's 
agitators may be removed and arrested. However, the Boston pro-
cedures never define a crowd agitator.33 
This lack of specificity in police procedures, in effect, relegates 
the first amendment rights of a speaker who is confronted by a hos-
tile audience to the individual discretion of the police officer on the 
scene. Because of the many biases within police administration 
that work against recognition of these rights, such unbridled discre-
tion is extremely objectionable. First, there is a natural inclina-
tion to regard disfavorably those who may generate disruption, 34 
32. POLICE DEPARTMENT, CJ.TI OF NEW Yoruc, INSTRUCTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF 
TIIE FORCE AT MASS DEMONSTRATIONS 8 (undated) (hereinafter NEW YORK DEM-
ONSTRATION INSTRUCTIONS). (''Department attorneys shall be utilized to advise and 
assist members of the force at the scene and the stationhouse"). The City of Detroit 
has a similar procedure. Letter from Micheal J. Falvo, Police Officer, Special Proj-
ects Section, Department of Police, Detroit, Michigan, to author, November 12, 1975 
( on file at Michigan Law Review) (hereinafter Detroit Letter) ("The Detroit Police 
Department • • . has a staff of legal advisors that are available on a twenty-four 
hour basis to give legal opinions to command officers"). 
33. BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, CROWD CONTROL TACTICS 50 (undated) (here-
inafter BOSTON CONTROL TACTICS). 
34. The lack of sympathy with demonstrators likely stem from a basic disrespect 
for dissidents and a feeling that protecting demonstrators is not the best use of men 
and equipment given the other needs of the community. See Lipez, The Law of 
Demonstrations: The Demonstrators, The Police, The Courts, 44 DENVER L.J. 499, 
509 (1967) ("[I]n their guts •.• [most police officers] .•. regard ..• demon-
strators as foolish, potentially dangerous, nuisances"); Fox, The CD Man, 33 THE 
POLICE CHIEF 20 (Nov. 1966) (Chief Inspector of Philadelphia Police Department 
writes that "[a] new monster, gorging itself on countless manhours and utilizing 
needed patrol equipment, has poked its ugly head into the busy offices of police 
executives throughout the country. This growing giant [is] known as 'The demon-
stration"'). See also Lewis v. Kugler, 446 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding 
that the district court improperly dismissed a complaint seeking to enjoin state police 
from subjecting "long-haired highway travelers" to unconstitutional searches and 
seizures); Hairston v. Hutzler, 334 F. Supp. 251 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (enjoining police 
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whether or not the speaker's conduct is legally protected. Negative 
attitudes of the community and police administrators toward radical 
views may also contribute to the innate hostility of police to provo-
cative speakers.35 This dislike may be further compounded by irrita-
bility aroused in police officers by a dislike of crowd control duties30 
as well as by the natural inclination of the officer given a choice be-
tween stopping a large, hostile crowd or stopping a few provocative 
speakers, to proceed against the speakers.37 Finally, there is the 
reality that the speaker has no effective remedies should the police 
violate his first amendment rights. 38 
There are, of course, objective difficulties in articulating mean-
ingful, operational standards and definitions for clarifying police 
conduct in hostile-audience situations.39 It is essential to recognize 
that police discretion is inextricably involved in determining the point 
at which the rights of free speech are outweighed by the state's in-
terest in preventing violence. Considering the volatile and often 
dangerous atmosphere surrounding hostile-audience situations, police 
procedures can hardly be expected to provide a precise blueprint for 
officer conduct and must by necessity be written in general terms. 40 
Still, the proposed standard is an improvement over the vague or 
nonexistent regulations prevalent today. The standard expressly 
from searching Blacks on the streets without having probable cause); Siedel, Injunc-
tive Relief for Police Misconduct in the United States, 50 J. URD. L. 681 (1973); 
Note, Regulation of Demonstrations, 80 HARV. L. RE.v. 1773 (1967). 
35. See generally J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 83-87 (1968). 
36. Fox, supra note 34, at 24 ("The average policeman doesn't enjoy guarding 
a picket line or protecting and preventing demonstrators from being attacked. It 
usually means long, hot, boring hours in one spot"). 
37. See Lipez, supra note 34, at 509. 
38. See section III infra. 
39. See Berkeley Letter, supra note 30 ("Unfortunately this Department has no 
formal procedures or manuals which address the [hostile-audience] situation. • • . 
Evaluating what constitutes a clear, present, and immediate danger of violence is 
a subjective matter which cannot be articulated satisfactorily in a written policy"); 
Detroit Letter, supra note 32 ("[M]y review of department orders bas failed to dis-
close specific policies or procedures that deal with the narrow issue of police re-
sponse when the rights of peaceful protesters are threatened by hostile spectators"). 
But cf. Letter from Captain C.M. Woods, Miami Police Department, Miami Florida, 
to author, October 2, 1975) (on file at Michigan Law Review) [hereinafter Miami 
Letter] ("We try to handle demonstrations by standing by as impartial observers to 
insure that all remains peaceful and only take police action when it becomes clearly 
evident that a disorderly situation is imminent ... "). 
40. See Detroit Letter, supra note 32: "Not surprisingly, many of the constitu-
tional issues in which law enforcement activity operates are likewise not amenable 
to strict and steadfast interpretations that cover the myriad of conceivable situations. 
Perhaps the best way to view the dilemma of the police administrator in setting 
policy in this area would be to look to the somewhat analogous situation of a law 
school attempting to set exhaustive policy guidelines as to when an attorney should 
advise his client to plead guilty to a criminal offense and forfeit bis constitutional 
right to trial. Obviously, the role of sound discretion and judgment cannot be dis-
counted in either case." 
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prohibits reliance on character or intent of speech. By focusing on 
"imminent violence," the standard also posits that actual violence 
need not have occurred to justify speaker removal. The use of the 
term "clear and present danger of imminent violence" will at least 
allow police department legal personnel to receive guidance from 
the courts from other free speech contexts. Although the policeman's 
discretion remains important, the standard focuses attention on the 
point at which police efforts to control a crowd are about to be over-
whelmed, and does not allow silencing the speaker for a lesser cause.41 
Most importantly, the remaining portions of the proposed hos-
tile-audience standard address the difficulties inherent in delineating 
a workable, substantive definition of imminent violence by advanc-
ing specific, procedural prerequisites that must be fulfilled before 
speech activities may be terminated and that define the manner of 
termination. Thus, police have the duty to take all reasonable steps 
to control the crowd and must provide a safe escort in case speaker 
departure is needed. The standard presents a solution to the hostile-
audience situation that is appropriate for police application and is 
fully compliant with current judicial doctrines of free speech. 
B. Police Measures Against the Hostile Audience 
In attempting to achieve the permissible objective of mJ:lintaining 
law and order, the police are constitutionally required to employ the 
means that least drastically interfere with the exercise of first amend-
ment rights. 42 In the hostile-audience context, this principle of law 
would seem to require that the police first take measures against 
the audience rather than passively wait for a situation of imminent 
violence to develop, which could then justify speaker dispersal. Thus, 
the proposed standard requires that before an assembly can be cur-
tailed, the authorities must exert all reasonable efforts to control 
the audience and order it to disperse. 
Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the 
issue of whether reasonable efforts must be first exerted against the 
crowd rather than against the speaker,43 several lower federal courts 
have held that the police not only have a duty to maintain the peace 
41. See Note, 26 N.Y.U. L. REV. 489, supra note 12, at 492, reasoning that 
if police can no longer control the hostile audience, thus making violence and blood-
shed imminent, no effective address could be delivered and hence there is no real 
alternative to police action limiting the demonstrators' ~peech. 
42. See generally Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE 
L.J. 464 (1968). 
43. However, in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939), the Supreme Court, 
in overturning the convictions of labor leaders who distributed leaflets and held pub-
lic meetings that were in violation of certain ordinances, stated: "[T]he uncon-
trolled official suppression of the [right to speak] cannot be made a substitute for 
the duty to maintain order in connection with the exercise of the right." 
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but also have a constitutional responsibility to take all reasonable 
steps to defend the speech rights of speakers confronted by a hostile 
audience.44 This requirement was explicitly endorsed by Justice 
Black in his dissenting opinion in Feiner v. New York: "If in the 
name of preserving order, [the police] ever can interfere with a 
lawful public speaker, they first must make all reasonable efforts 
to protect him . . . even to the extent of arresting [members of 
the hostile audience]."45 Failure by the police to take reasonable, 
affirmative action against the audience would effectively make the 
police a party to the abridgment of first amendment rights. 46 
The test of reasonableness, recognized by numerous courts and 
commentators, 47 has been incorporated into the standard proposed 
by this Note. The police procedures reviewed seem to comport with 
the general requirement that reasonable crowd control efforts be 
taken prior to silencing, dispersing or detaining the speakers. Clearly 
crowd control must be a necessary police measure, both to protect 
speakers' constitutional rights and to maintain order.48 
44. E.g., Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 94 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968); Kelley v. Page, 335 F.2d 114, 119 (5th Cir. 1964); 
Hurwitt v. Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995, 1001 (N,D. Cal. 1965); Williams v. Wallace, 
240 F. Supp. 100, 109 (M.D. Ala. 1965). See Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE 
UNITEI) STATES 425 (1948) (''The sound constitutional doctrine is that the public 
authorities have the obligation to provide police protection against threatened disor-
der at lawful public meetings in all reasonable circumstances"). See also Downie 
v. Powers, 193 R2d 760 (10th Cir. 1951); Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877, 881 
(8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 851 (1948). 
45. 340 U.S. at 326-27. 
46. Cf. Downie v. Powers, 193 F.2d 760, 764 (10th Cir. 1951). 
41. See authorities cited notes 43-46 supra. 
48. See BOSTON CONTROL TACTICS, supra note 33, at 48 (emphasizing that police 
must protect the rights of all persons to assemble peacefully); Berkeley Letter, supra 
note 30 ("Our mission in dealing with public assemblies and gatherings is to protect 
life and property, while at the same time allowing for full exercise of First Amend-
ment liberties"); Miami Letter, supra note 39. ("With respect to peaceful demon-
strators among hostile spectators we would be duly bound to protect their rights 
of assembly and speech where ever possible . . . . Naturally once a riot begins 
it becomes imperative that we restore calm and order quickly. The usual non-violent 
tactics of crowd control would be employed such as breaking the crowd into small 
groups, isolating and dispersing them. If the crowd became combative, tear gas 
might have to be employed, but this would be avoided if at all possible"). UNITED 
STATES NATIONAL .ADVISORY CoMMN. ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 267 (1968) 
I.hereinafter CIVIL DISORDERS REPORT]. For example, the members of the Philadel-
phia Civil Disobedience Unit all receive a week of lectures from a sociologist who 
counsels the unit in overcoming prejudices, Lipez, supra note 34, at 508. Efforts 
are also being made to teach officers toleration of divergent viewpoints. E.g., NEW 
Yoruc GUIDELINES, supra note 29, at 3: 
''To have a meaningful vote the voters must have all opinions put before 
them . • . . History shows that often the ideas of unpopular groups have later 
become generally supported . . . . Of course, policemen, as other citizens, may 
have strong feelings for or against the position taken by a particular group of 
demonstrators. But our private feelings cannot affect our professional conduct-
they cannot if our democracy is to work." 
See also CIVIL DISORDERS REPORT, supra note 48, at 171 which quotes an FBI manual 
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The proposed test obviously cannot be applied uniformly and 
allows both police discretion in the field and· judicial discretion 
on review. It must be recognized that the pragmatic considerations 
of police training, effectiveness of equipment, 49 and quantity of police 
manpower50 all combine in varying proportions in each community 
to render any more specific standard for crowd control inappropriate 
for general application. Illustrative of the great variation in factors 
that affect police conduct is the availability to departments of crowd 
control training, which has been described as "the most critical defi-
ciency of all" in the preparedness of police departments for handling 
civil disorders. 51 Thus, while many large metropolitan police de-
partments generally have crowd control training programs, 52 the 
situation in smaller communities is often less satisfactory. For ex-
ample, according to one study, more than forty per cent of Illinois 
officers outside the City of Chicago have never received formal 
training of any kind. 53 
The availability of police manpower, irrespective of the level of 
training, is also subject to wide variation. - Although department size 
should be geared to a city's population size, and population size 
will often be determinative in limiting the scale of a hostile-audience 
situation, it is clear that small cities with small police forces will be 
unable to cope with certain emergencies that would be within the 
capability of large cities. 54 
prepared for law enforcement officers: "A peaceful or lawful demonstration should 
not be looked upon with disapproval by a police agency; rather, it should be con-
sidered a safety valve possibly serving to prevent a riot . • . ." 
49. Few departments, for example, can furnish the protective clothing needed 
by officers in their forays with a hostile audience. Unfortunately, the only adequate 
equipment available is handguns, an ineffective civil disorder control weapon. 
See CML DISORDERS REPORT, supra note 48, at 271. 
50. ''The capability of a police department to control a civil disorder depends 
essentially on two factors: proper planning and competent performance. These de-
pend in turn upon the quantity and quality of police manpower, the training of patrol-
men, and the effectiveness of their equipment." CML DISORDERS REPORT, supra 
note 48, at 267. 
51. Clvn. DISORDERS REPORT, supra note 48, at 270. See also THE PRESIDENT'S 
COMMN. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE 
OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY 107 (1967) which states that "substantially raising 
the quality of police personnel would inject into police work knowledge, expertise, 
initiative, and integrity that would contribute importantly to improved crime control." 
52. Clvn. DISORDERS REPORT, supra note 48, at 174. However, even in many 
large cities, the crowd control training is primarily received only by recruits. Id. 
53. D. FARMER, CIVIL DISORDER CoNTROL, A PLANNING PROGRAM OF MUNICIPAL 
COORDINATION AND COOPERATION 3 (Pub. Ad. Serv. 1968). 
54. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 127 (1969) (Black, 
J., concurring), where 100 police officers, having made advance crowd control prep-
arations in the form of barricades, street closings, and strategic deployment of offi-
cers prior to the demonstrators' arrival, were unable to control a hostile crowd of 
1200 persons. Whenever an initial incident erupts into a major crowd control prob-
lem, most police departments are confronted with a difficult manpower problem. Of 
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Even if the total number of officers in the police department 
were sufficient, two other factors impede the formulation of a specific 
standard for crowd control. First, it is clear that there are legiti-
mate, competing demands on police resources and that diversion of 
officers to a hostile-audience situation necessarily will result in leav-
ing areas of the city unpatrolled. 55 Second, if the police do not have 
advance notice of an impending hostile-audience situation, man-
power limitations are compounded by the enormous and time-con-
suming task of mobilizing police personnel. 56 Even if forces ade-
quate to handle a hostile-audience situation were potentially available, 
there is an inevitable time lag between recognition of the need for 
such forces and their mobilization. During the period of mobilization, 
riotous conditions may intensify beyond police control. 57 Thus, this 
time lag may render impractical the activation of such outside forces 
as the National Guard, which has often been considered to be a 
stand-by police force, to protect the speech. 58 Although reasonable 
efforts of crowd control would, in many circumstances, include the 
dispatch of additional forces to the scene, a requirement to call 'Out 
additional force in every case is too rigid in light of the time and 
manpower constraints under which the police must realistically oper-
ate. 
The standard of reasonableness in assessing police efforts of 
crowd control should not only encompass the levels of manpower 
and equipment allocated to crowd control, but also should be used 
those cities having more than 100,000 residents, 71 per cent have less than 500 
policemen. CIVIL DISORDERS REPORT, supra note 48, at 173. 
55. CIVIL DISORDERS REPORT, supra note 48, at 173-74. 
56. See id. at 268, quoting an anonymous police commissioner in a large city 
where a major civil disorder had erupted: 
'llt cannot be emphasized too strongly that mobilization is inherently a time 
consuming operation, no matter how efficient. After a man is notified, he 
must dress and travel to his reporting point. Once he has checked in and has 
been equipped, he must be . . . transported to an • . . assembly point • • • • 
He must then be actually committed to the area of involvement. The time lapse 
in this entire procedure ranges from 1 ½ to 2 hours." 
57. In order to control a riotous situation effectively, large numbers of police 
must be mobilized as soon as possible: "While a time lag is unavoidable, its crippling 
effects can be diminished greatly by the development of prearranged civil disturbance 
procedures which are swiftly and intelligently applied in time of stress." Leary, 
The Role of Police in Riotous Demonstrations, 40 NOTRE DAME LAw. 499, 503< 
04 (1965). 
58. The National Guard may appear as an adjunct police force, available to quell 
hostile audiences whenever local police efforts are exhausted. The Report of the 
National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders, however, suggests that the Guard 
is neither continually available to nor easily integrated with the local police. This 
is largely because the Guard's primary commitment and preparation is for augment-
ing the army and air force. See CIVIL DISORDERS REPORT, supra note 48, at 275. 
It is generally preferable to use local police rather than the Guard or state forces. 
Repeated deployment of the military against rioters demoralizes the community and 
may reduce the "deterrent" or "shock" value of troops. It is best to keep the Guard 
in reserve for extreme emergencies. D. FARMER, supra note 53, at 4-S, 
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to evaluate the types of crowd control techniques applied by the 
police. One type of crowd control effort that merits special atten-
tion is the use 'Of the arrest power to expel belligerent members of 
the audience. The hostile-audience context creates some subtle legal 
and practical difficulties that preclude the imposition on police of a 
strict duty to arrest. It must first be recognized, as a general rule, 
that the expression of contrary views on the part of a spectator or 
"counter-demonstrator," although disquieting, is protected by the 
first amendment. Arrest is only warranted when the spectator's ac-
tions transgress the bounds of constitutional protection and, for ex-
ample, either amount to a specific incitement to unlawful activity 
or, under some circumstances, materially and substantially disrupt 
a person's lawful speech. Thus, the New York Police Department 
guidelines advise that, while a certain amount of heckling is a part 
of our tradition, "[f]reedom of speech does not include the right 
to become so disruptive at meetings that the meeting cannot con-
tinue."59 Once a spectator has engaged in unlawful conduct or 
has begun to incite disruption, arrest may sometimes prove to be 
an effective means of removing those persons before the situation 
escalates to an uncontrollable level. 60 
Even under circumstances in which a heckler would be subject 
to arrest, however, officers should not have an absolute duty to do 
so, for this would deprive them of vital discretion in controlling a 
crowd and could spark disastrously counter-productive results. Many 
police administrators warn that even simple arrests for summary 
offenses can precipitate a riot, 61 and police guidelines counsel offi-
cers not to make indiscriminate arrests.02 New York City police 
instructions, for example, caution that application of indiscriminate 
force can convert a peaceful assembly into a hostile mob. 63 More-
over, mass arrests will not only deplete needed police manpower64 
but may, through an overloading of the jails, bail process and courts, 
also place substantial burdens on the criminal justice system of a 
given community.65 At the same time, a low rate of convictions 
may result from the inability of the arresting officer to recall the 
circumstances of one specific arrest out of many.66 Thus, the practi-
59. NEW YORK GUIDELINES, supra note 29, at 15. 
60. The Boston Police Department advises its officers that removal of a crowd's 
leaders is an important objective should it be necessary to disperse the crowd. 
BOSTON CoN'I'ROL TACTICS, supra note 33, at 53. 
61. See id. at 49; Fox, supra note 34, at 24. 
62. See BoSTON CoNTRoL TAcncs, supra note 33, at 49; Lipez, supra note 34, 
at 510. 
63. NEW YORK DEMONSTRATION !NSTRUCI1ONS, supra note 32, at 12. 
64. See NEW YORK DEMONSTRATION lNSTRUCI1ONS, supra note 32, at 10. 
65. See Dodds & Dempsey, Civil Disorders: The Impact of Mass Arrests on the 
Criminal Justice System, 35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 355 (1969). 
66. Some police guidelines place substantial emphasis on making "quality" arrests 
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cal problems in determining whether arrests should be made in the 
hostile-audience context render unworkable a stringent duty to arrest. 
It has been argued that because of the complexity and diversity 
·of hostile-audience situations, the standard of police conduct toward 
the audience should, as a general rule, merely be one of reasonable-
ness under the particular facts and circumstances that confront the 
police. There are, however, some specific duties that can be re-
quired of the police that are derived from their constitutional obli-
gation to protect first amendment rights. In particular, no serious 
operational problems would appear to arise from a requirement that 
the police must order the hostile audience to disperse and that, if 
time permits, they must explain the order. An order to disperse, 
now incorporated in many police manuals, 67 seems far less likely 
than arrests or the use of force to inflame an already aroused audience 
and, additionally, it warns innocent spectators of a potential escala-
tion of police tactics. Although certainly not conclusive evidence 
that all reasonable efforts of crowd control were actually undertaken, 
the giving of such an order would provide a clear, objective mani-
festation that police efforts were first directed at protecting the 
rights of free speech, and is therefore mandated in the proposed 
standard. 
Under some circumstances, the police should not only give a 
dispersal order, which they are compelled to do, but should also ex-
plain fully their reasons for taking this extreme step. Such a pro-
cedure may contribute greatly to audience compliance with the 
dispersal order. 68 Still, while always desirable, a complete explana-
tion may be made impossible by the exigencies of a particular hostile-
audience situation. Thus, the proposed standard submits that the 
explanation be encouraged but not required in all cases. 
C. Prerequisites to Speaker Removal 
Contrasted with the flexibility given to the police concerning the 
the explanation of a crowd dispersal order is the firm requirement, 
that have a high probability of resulting in convictions. Therefore, it is important 
that officers recall the circumstances surrounding each arrest. This can be facilitated 
by limiting the number of persons an officer takes into custody at any one time. 
See, e.g., NEW YORK DEMONSTRATION INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 32, at 10: "No 
officer should arrest more defendants than he can identify. Where possible one 
( 1) officer should be assigned to arrest one ( 1) prisoner, but no more than three 
(3) or four ( 4) prisoners to an officer. If possible, when a female is arrested, 
the arresting officer should arrest only females due to separate transportation, deten-
tion, and arrest procedures." 
67. Lipez, supra note 34, at 510-11; BOSTON CONTROL TACTICS, supra note 33, 
at 52; NEW YORK DEMONSTRATION INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 32, at 9, 22. 
68. Police officers should always explain their actions. Because demonstrators 
are often suspicious of police motives, an explanation will improve the chances of 
demonstrator cooperation. See Note, supra note 34, at 1787. 
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if reasonable measures of crowd control fail, for both the issuance 
and explanation of an order requiring a speaker to depart. It is sub-
mitted that the mere necessity of departure does not provide a basis 
for the arrest of a speaker absent the announcement and explanation 
by police of an order to depart. This conclusion is based both on the 
nature of the first amendment rights that are being suppressed and 
on the practical realities of the hostile-audience situation. 
First, the proposed standard assumes that the speaker is engaged 
in lawful speech activity that could not be interfered with apart from 
the hostile-audience context. The belligerent response of the crowd 
cannot, in itself, convert such lawful speech into speech that is un-
lawful. 69 Although in a situation of imminent violence the state's 
interests in law and order may surpass the individual rights of free 
speech, and, thus, justify termination of speech activities, there is 
no compelling justification for the arrest and punishment of the 
speaker. Such drastic measures should only be permitted when the 
speaker fails to obey a lawful police order to depart. 70 
Another first amendment interest that implies a need for an 
order prior to direct police action is the prevention of a chilling 
effect that might accrue from the threat that speech might without 
notice bring criminal liability. An arrest prior to the issuance and 
explanation of an order to disperse would effectively shift responsi-
bility from the police to the speaker to determine whether the police 
will be able to control the audience and to discern that violence is 
imminent. Since the speaker will usually be unaware of both the 
minute-to-minute plans of the police and the quantity and effective-
ness of police resources, the speaker's judgment of the appropriate-
ness of the police order would inherently be little more than specula-
tion. If speakers could be arrested and punished because they in-
correctly assessed the situation and continued speaking, it is likely 
that many would succumb to a heckler's veto rather than take the 
risks inherent in exercising their rights of free speech to the fullest. 
To minimize the premature termination of speech, , the proposed 
hostile-audience standard places the burden upon police to order 
a speaker to depart and to explain that order. The speaker may 
then make an informed evaluation of the situation and knowingly 
accept the consequences of either disregarding or obeying the police 
order. 
The final justification for the requirement that orders be explained 
derives from the proper relationship between the state's authority 
and the individual in our society. As Justice Black noted in his 
dissent in Fiener v. New York, "[a] man m~ng a lawful address is 
69. See, e.g., Bachellar v. Maryiand, 397 U.S. 564, 567 (1970). See also Greg-
ory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 119 (1969) (Black, J., concurring). 
70. See section II infra. 
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certainly not required to be silent merely because an officer directs it. 
[He is] entitled to know why he should cease doing a lawful act. . . . 
I understand that people in authoritarian countries must obey arbitrary 
orders. I had hoped that there was no such duty in the United 
States."71 An important objective of the explanation requirement 
is the reduction of the kind of police arbitrariness in stifling speech 72 
that is unacceptable in our society. 
The necessity of lawful and controlled police behavior was 
affirmed by the Supreme Court in Cox v. Louisiana.73 In that case 
the Court reversed the conviction of several demonstrators for failure 
to obey a sheriffs order to disperse and concluded that failure to 
comply was not unlawful where that order was supported by an 
invalid reason.74 Although in Cox the arbitrariness of the dispersal 
order was heightened because the sheriff had first granted and then, 
shortly thereafter, had withdrawn permission for the demonstration, 
the use of an arbitrary order for a speaker to depart in a hostile-
audience situation would be similarly invalid. Even though the 
Court did not address the issue of whether an order to a speaker had 
to be explained, the reasoning of Cox would seem to imply that there 
is such a duty. It would be anomalous to strike down an improper 
order where the invalid reason was stated yet condone an order 
that may have been equally improper but the impropriety of which 
cannot be proved because no explanation was given at the time. 
If a speaker has a right not to obey an improper order, then the 
speaker should have a right to know the basis for any order that is 
given and to have the stated basis on the record for later judicial 
proceedings. 
It should finally be noted that the benefits from an explained 
order are not confined to the speaker but will also accrue to the 
police. For example, the explanation is likely to generate greater 
speaker compliance with the order, 75 and the police will thus have 
to arrest only those who wilfully refuse to obey.76 As was indicated 
in the discussion of crowd dispersal, 77 a reduction in arrests not 
only reduces the immediate burdens of making the arrest itself 
but will also reduce the subsequent duties of filing reports, 78 and, 
71. 340 U.S. at 327-28 (Black, J., dissenting). 
72. See Note, supra note 68, at 1787. Explanations may also increase the likeli-
hood of speaker cooperation. 
73. 379 U.S. 559 (1965). 
74. 379 U.S. at 572. 
15. See note 68 supra. 
16. See Note, supra note 68, at 1787. See generally Leary, supra note 57. 
77. See text at notes 64-65 supra. 
78. See, e.g., NEW YORK DEMONSTRATION INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 32, at 13, 
detailing the many responsibilities of an arresting officer. 
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ultimately, making courtroom appearances.70 Additionally, the major 
strains that could occasionally be placed on a city's criminal justice 
system by mass arrests may also be avoided. 80 Given these bene-
fits, it is not surprising that police procedures typically direct the 
superior officer at the scene to follow an order to a speaker with 
an explanation.81 
D. The Requirement of Safe Escort 
In addition to explaining an order requiring a speaker to depart, 
the police must provide a safe escort for the speaker and must, if time 
permits, actually extend an offer of safe escort before ordering depar-
ture. This requirement is derived from the general duty of the police 
to protect from physical harm citizens engaged in lawful conduct and 
also from concern that lack of such protection will intimidate all 
speakers and will discourage them from exercising fully their first 
amendment rights. Absent a police· duty of safe escort, even assured 
police compliance with a standard requiring reasonable crowd control 
efforts and orders to disperse would not remove the chill on speakers 
engendered by the probability of ultimate physical harm. It may 
of course be argued that since the police were unable to control the 
spectator audience they will also be unable to provide the speakers 
safe egress; but such a contention ignores the fact that relative police 
strength will increase as officers concentrate on providing an escort 
for the speakers rather than on restraining the entire crowd, and 
that audience belligerency may diminish as the speakers' departure 
becomes evident. 
The proposed standard also suggests that, where possible, the 
police should make an offer of safe conduct to a speaker who has 
been asked to depart. This practice would often be in ,the police 
officer's self interest, since it could significantly increase the likeli-
hood of speaker compliance. 82 Although police· procedures do not 
generally include an offer for safe escort for the speakers, the recom-
mendation of such an offer could easily be incorporated into the 
explanation of the order.83 However, given the exigencies of the 
79. Courtroom appearances are not only time-consuming but also may subject 
the arresting officer to the hostile cross examination of defense attorneys. See Lipez, 
supra note 34, at 511. 
80. See note 65 supra. 
81. The dispersal proclamation "should be clear and unequivocal. It should state 
the legal basis for the proclamation, issue a firm order to disperse and designate 
the avenues of exit." BosToN CONTROL TACTICS, supra note 33, at 52. See Lipez, 
supra note 34, at 510-11. 
82. See text at notes 67-68 & note 72 supra. 
83. See Gregozy v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 129 (1969) (Black, J., con-
curring), which relates the dispersal order given to a group of demonstrators because 
their hostile audience could no longer be restrained by police: "[Police] Commander 
Pierson told Gregory the situation was dangerous and becoming riotous. He asked 
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situations in which they are compelled to terminate speech 
activities, the police should not be burdened with a rigid duty to 
provide nonessential instructions or explanations. Thus, as was the 
case with the explanation of an order to the hostile audience to 
disperse, 84 an offer of safe escort to a speaker is not an absolute 
requirement. 
II. SANCTIONS FOR SPEAKER NONCOMPLIANCE 
WITH AN URDER TO DEPART 
Even when a police order to a speaker is lawful and is ac-
companied by a complete explanation with an offer of safe 
conduct, the speaker may still refuse to comply. This Note now 
focuses upon the sanctions to which a speaker may be liable for 
disobeying a lawful police order and suggests a means less drastic 
than arrest and prosecution for furthering the state's interest in law 
and order. 
The proposed hostile-audience standard provides that, if the 
speaker obeys an order to disperse, he may neither be arrested for 
having caused audience hostility nor charged with any offense inci-
dental to the events of an otherwise lawful assembly. Until the 
time at which violence becomes imminent and an explained, speaker 
dispersal order is given, the speaker has been engaging in the lawful 
exercise of first amendment rights and should not be subject to arrest. 
Once violence is imminent, however, failure to comply with a lawful 
police order to disperse renders a speaker liable for arrest and prose-
cution under clear, narrowly written laws. 85 
A speaker who disobeys a dispersal order may be criminally 
liable under numerous statutes, including those that prohibit refusal 
to obey an officer's command, 86 obstructing an officer in the per-
formance of official duties, 87 and disorderly conduct. 88 Although 
Gregory if he would co-operate and lead the marchers out of the area. The request 
to leave the area was made about five times. Pierson then told the marchers that 
any of them who wished to leave th~ area would be given a police escort." 
84. See text at notes 67-68 supra. 
85. E.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). But see Feiner v. New 
York, 340 U.S. 315 (1950). The overbreadth doctrine has been modified in recent 
years. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). 
86. Failure to obey the command of a police officer is a traditional form of 
breach of the peace as long as the command is itself lawful. See Wright v. Georgia, 
373 U.S. 284,292 (1963). 
87. See cases discussed in Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 382 (1950). 
88. An example of a disorderly conduct ordinance that provides for crowd dis-
persal orders is CHICAGO, !LL. MUNICIPAL CODE § 193-l(d) (1974), discussed in note 
8 supra: 
A person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly: 
* * * 
(d) Fails to obey a lawful order of dispersal by a person known to him to 
be a peace officer under circumstances where three or more tiersons are com-
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these charges typically carry small fines or short jail terms, they 
nevertheless "mark" the accused with an arrest record and, possibly, 
with a criminal conviction. 89 Since most prosecutors are elected 
officials and are therefore sensitive to public opinion, they may feel 
substantial pressure to prosecute those speakers who have provocative 
and unpopular views. However, even if a prosecution is not com-
menced, the fact of arrest will usually remain on record. 90 Such 
arrest records may severely damage the violators' job prospects, 91 
credit rating,92 and status within the community. 
mitting acts of disorderly conduct in the immediate vicinity, which acts are 
likely to cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm. 
See Comment, The Proposed Criminal Code: Disorderly Conduct and Related Of-
fenses, 40 TENN. L. R.Ev. 725 (1973); 1 J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAw § 539 (9th ed. 
1923). 
89. See o. WILSON, POLICE R.EcoRDS, THEIR INSTALLATION AND USE 89 (1942); 
Comment, Police Records of Arrest: A Brief for the Right to Remove Them from 
Police Files, 17 ST. Loms L.J. 263 (1972). 
90. Courts are divided on whether it is appropriate to restrict access to police 
files or to expunge the records altogether. See, e.g., United States v. Kalish, 271 
F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967) (a citizen being haunted by past criminal records vio-
lates his right of privacy); Eddy v. Moore, 487 P.2d 211 (Wash. App. 1971) (penum-
bra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights entitles individuals to the return 
of their criminal files upon acquittal). But see Spock v. District of Columbia, 283 
A.2d 14 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971) (demonstrators against whom criminal charges were 
dropped have no entitlement to destruction of police records); Cissell v. Brostron, 
395 S.W.2d 322 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) (denial of injunction against dissemination). 
Expungement statutes have been enacted in a minority of states but have not 
succeeded in removing the taint of criminality from an individual. See Comment, 
Criminal Records of Arrest and Conviction: Expungement from the General Public 
Access, 3 CALIF. Wr:sr. L. R.Ev. 121, 125 (1967). Unfortunately, criminal records 
are so scattered that it is impractical to fashion an order expunging them all. See 
Kogon and Loughery, Sealing and Expungement of Criminal Records-The Big Lie, 
61 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 378, 383-84 (1970). Often substantial state interests demand 
that records be kept of some criminal activity, leaving expungement statutes riddled 
with debilitating exceptions. See generally Note, The Effect of Expungement on 
a Criminal Conviction, 40 S. CAL. L. R.Ev. 127, 132-43 (1967). 
For examples of expungement statutes, see Government Organization and Em-
ployees Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2)C (1970) (empowers administrative agencies to 
"delete identifying details" from official publications to "prevent a clearly unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy"); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 516 (McKinney 1966) 
(automatic expungement of disorderly conduct violations). See also ILL. R.Ev. STAT. 
ch. 38, §§ 206-07 (1973). 
91. Even in jurisdictions having laws expunging police records, employers, law 
enforcement agencies, and even the courts have ignored the policies of this legisla-
tion. See Menarq v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Steele, A Sug-
gested Legislative Device for Dealing with Abuses of Criminal Records, 6 U. MICH. 
J. L. REF. 32, 39 (1972). Many states, in fact, automatically deny occupational li-
censes to persons having criminal records. See Note, Employment for Former Crim-
inals, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 306, 308-10 (1970). See also Special Project, The Col-
lateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REv. 929 (1970), for 
an extensive treatment of the civil disabilities accompanying criminal conviction. 
92. Credit bureaus have files on over one hundred million persons and write 
an additional one hundred million credit reports each year. See H. BLACK, BUY 
Now AND PAY LATER 37 (1961); M. BRENTON, THE PRlvACY lNvADEllS (1964). In 
fact, the Credit Bureau of Greater New York City has a division that compiles the 
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While the sanctions of criminal statutes may thus be· applied 
reasonably and in a "neutral" manner against disobedient speakers, 
and may in fact facilitate speedy removal of the speakers from danger, 
the resulting "stamp" of criminality seems a drastic punishment for 
individuals seeking to exercise their first amendment rights to the 
fullest. When such a fundamental, constitutional interest as free 
speech is at stake, the fact that the state has a compelling interest 
in the maintenance of order does not free the state from the require-
ment that it employ the least drastic means possible to achieve that 
interest. 93 The use of criminal sanctions is frequently not necessary 
to achieve the legitimate purpose of maintaining the peace and, 
therefore, is not the least drastic means. The proposed standard 
suggests the alternative of temporary protective custody,04 which 
imposes fewer restraints on a speaker's personal liberty than does 
the operation of the criminal justice system and which does not leave 
the' permanent stigma of an arrest. 
Temporary protective custody as an alternative to arrest and 
prosecution has been traditionally employed by the American legal 
system in connection with classes of persons who are unable to care 
for themselves-the mentally incompetent, 95 juveniles, 00 disabled per-
sons, 97 drug addicts,98 and drunks00-or for the confinement of ma-
names of civil litigants and criminal defendants in local courts. The resulting file 
contains reports on over fourteen million suits, judgments, and other actions. Hear• 
ings on Commercial Credit Bureaus Before the Special Subcomm. on Invasion of 
Privacy of the House Comm. on Govt. Operations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); 
Kaxst, "The Files": Legal Control over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stores 
Personnel Data, 31 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 342 (1966); Note, Credit Investigation 
and the Right to Privacy: Quest for a Remedy, 51 GEO. L.J. 509 (1969). 
93. See note 42 supra. 
94. See Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1481, 1513 
(1970) ("perhaps the problem of an unexpected and uncontrollable hostile audience 
ought to justify some form of minimal, though involuntary, restraint such as placing 
the demonstrators in temporary protective custody although this solution presents 
the danger that the minimal nature of the restraint may lead to its abuse by overly 
cautious, or personally hostile, police"). 
95. E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-178, 17-183 (Supp. 1975); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. §§ 330.1435, 330.1438 (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.1 (Cum, 
Supp. 1975). These statutes provide for temporary protective custody commitment 
to state mental hospitals. See also Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 570 ( 1963). 
96. Section 6(a) (5) of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act provides that "[a proba-
tion officer] shall take into custody and detain a child who is under his supervision 
or care as a delinquent, unruly or deprived child if the probation officer has reason-
able cause to believe that the child's health or safety is in imminent danger, or 
that he may abscond or be removed from the jurisdiction of the court, or where 
ordered by the court pursuant to this Act." Georgia and North Dakota have enacted 
substantially similar laws: GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 24A-101 to -4001 (1975); N.D. 
CENT. CODE §§ 27-20-01 to -59 (1974). California and New York provide 
protective custody for juveniles: CALIF. WELF. & INST. CODE ANN. §§ 602, 625 
(West 1976); N.Y. FAMILY CoURT ACT§ 721 (McKinney 1963). 
97. Section 3{e) of the Uniform Duties to Disabled Persons Act states: 
"A [law enforcement officer] who determines or has reason to believe that a dis-
abled person is suffering from an illness causing his condition shall promptly notify 
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terial witnesses whose appearance at trial is deemed necessary to 
fulfill the requirement of a fair trial or to protect the constitutional 
right of confrontation. 100 The use. of this device in the hostile-
audience context does not rest explicitly on these rationales, although 
protection of the speaker from a hostile crowd is an important reason 
for taking the speaker into custody. The primary interest here, how-
ever, is to use a means of advancing the state's legitimate interest in 
preserving order that will not overburden the speaker's first amend-
ment right. Although the application of temporary protective cus-
tody in this context may be unique, it appears warranted by a proper 
respect for freedom of speech. 
A possible defect in this proposal is that "the minimal nature 
of the restraint may lead to its abuse by overly cautious, or personally 
hostile, police."101 This concern is reasonable in light of the in-
the person's physician, if practicable . . . . [If not practicable] the officer shall 
make a reasonable effort to cause the disabled person to be transported immediately 
to a medical practitioner or to a facility where medical treatment is available. If 
the officer believes it unduly dangerous to move the disabled person, he shall make 
a reasonable effort to obtain the assistance of a medical practitioner." This model 
law has been enacted in Colorado, Minnesota and North Dakota: CoLo. REv. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 25-20-101 to 25-20-108 (1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145.851 to 145.858 
(1975); N.D. CENT. CoDE §§ 23.28-1 to 23.28-9 (1973). 
98. The Uniform Drug Dependence Treatment & Rehabilitation Act § 503(a) 
provides that "[w]henever a police officer or :public health officer is notified by 
an interested person that a person appears incapacitated by a [drug], the police 
officer or public health officer may bring the person to a treatment facility for emer-
gency medical services • . . . A police officer or public health officer, in bringing 
in a person to or detaining him in a treatment facility, takes him into protective 
custody and shall make every effort to protect his health and safety. This taking 
is not an arrest, and no entry or other record may be made to indicate that he 
has been arrested for or charged with a crime." This Act has not yet been enacted 
by any state. 
99. The Uniform Alcoholism & Intoxication Treatment Act § 126 states that 
"A person who appears to be incapacitated by alcohol shall be taken into protective 
custody by the police or emergency service patrol. A taking into protective custody 
is not an arrest." Legislation similar to this has been enacted in nine states: Aus. 
SrAT. §§ 47.37.010 to ,47.37.270 (1972); COLO. REV. SrAT. §§ 25-1-301 to 25-1-
316 (Supp. 1975); GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 99-3901 to 99-3921 (1976); loWA CoDE ANN. 
§ 125.1 to 125.37 (Supp. 1976); KAN. SrAT. ANN. §§ 65-4001 to 65-4058 (Supp. 
1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1361 to 1383 (Supp. 1975); R.I. GEN. LAws 
§§ 40.1-4-1 to 40.1-4-19 (Supp. 1974); S.D. CoMP. LAWS §§ 34-20A-1 to 34-20A-
97 (Supp. 1974); WASH. REv. CODE§§ 70.96A.010 to 70.96A.930 (1975). 
100. See, e.g., N.Y. CODE OF CRIM. PRoc. § 618-b (McKinney 1958). 
101. Whereas arrest justifies the indefinite holding of persons by police either 
until bail is obtained or a trial conducted, the permissible period of temporary pro-
tective custody absent judicial intervention, is usually statutorially limited to a spe-
cific time. Given that temporary custody's duration for hostile audience confronta-
tions need only be sufficient to allow removal of the speakers, custody could be 
limited, for example, to two hours barring a judicial determination that longer deten-
tion is necessary to prevent truly determined speakers from immediately renewing 
the confrontation. The Uniform Arrest Act allows police detention of up to two 
hours on the "reasonable ground," as determined by the police officer, that the sus-
pect "is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime." UNIFORM AR-
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herent difficulty in the traditional application of temporary protective 
custody in determining whether a particular person is properly within 
the class of persons to which the statute applies, e.g., whether a 
person is drunk, an addict or merely sick. Thus, it is arguable that 
the police may be more inclined to terminate speech prematurely if 
the consequences for the speaker are lessened. However, the po-
tential for such abuse would be substantially reduced in situations 
governed by the proposed hostile-audience standard. The issue of 
whether to apply temporary protective custody will not arise until 
all the prerequisites outlined in the standard have been met, including 
failure of the speaker to comply with an explained order to depart. 
At this point, the alternatives to temporary protective custody 
are either arrest, a more drastic sanction made permissible by the 
likely existence of probable cause; forcible removable by the police 
without arrest, which is essentially equivalent to temporary protec-
tive custody; or taking no action at all, which may expose the speakers 
to physical assault from an uncontrollable audience. Thus, temporary 
protective custody represents an abuse only if the speaker would have 
voluntarily complied with the order to depart but was prevented 
from doing so. Moreover, even if such an abuse occurs the conse-
quences are relatively insubstantial, since the termination of speech 
activity has already been determined to be necessary and the incur-
sion upon the speaker's liberty is minor. 
Thus, the critical question is not whether the availability of tem-
porary protective custody will spawn abuses, but rather in what 
· situations arrest should be applied as an alternative. In most hostile-
audience contexts, rapid removal of the speaker is likely to be essen-
tial if the paramount state goal of preventing violence is to be 
achieved. If a speaker who has refused to obey voluntarily an order 
to depart submits to temporary protective custody and does not 
materially interfere with police efforts, then formal arrest would 
seem unwarranted.102 Through the use of temporary protective 
custody, the state will thus be able to defuse a volatile situation 
without unnecessarily stigmatizing the speaker with an arrest record 
and, at the same time, the speaker may avoid the appearance of too 
REST Ac:r § 2. Delaware, New Hampshire and Rhode Island have enacted statutes 
similar to the Uniform Arrest Act: 11 DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 1901 to 1910 (1974); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 594.1 to ·594.14 (1955) (providing for 4 hours detention); 
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 12-7-1 to 12-7-17 (1970). See generally Warner, The Uni-
form Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315 (1942). 
The use of temporary protective custody should not be viewed as the equivalent 
of compliance with an order to depart. Although the restraints are temporary, 
they are real, and a speaker may be subjected to incarceration which can be a harsh 
and humiliating experience. 
102. Of course, what constitutes material interference cannot be explicitly deline-
ated. There are many varying factors that may affect such a determination, such 
as the number of police officers at the scene, the type and degree of speaker re-
sistance and the vehemence of the hostile audience during speaker removal. 
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easily capitulating to police demands. More importantly, the speaker 
will .have been able to push his first amendment rights to their outer 
limits and will suffer only a minor sanction for exceeding the bounds 
of the permissible. In contrast, a speaker who refuses to obey a 
police order to depart and also materially interferes with police 
efforts should be liable to arrest. Not only must such conduct be 
punished, but the potential sanction of arrest will also substantially 
deter affirmative speaker resistance to an order or to the application 
of temporary protective custody. 
Although temporary protective custody thus appears to be an 
appropriate technique for hostile-audience situations, current police 
procedures do not include it as a means for removing speakers. It 
is, of course, well established that the police have the constitutional 
power to arrest when there is probable cause to believe that an ·un-
lawful act has been committed. Yet it is unclear whether an offi-
cer can take a person into temporary protective custody without 
having an underlying statutory basis, not only for the suspected crime, 
but also for the procedure of temporary protective custody itself.103 
Until municipalities explicitly empower police to use temporary pro-
tective custody to remove speakers from hostile-audience confronta-
tions and provide clear procedural guidelines, 104 police departments, 
fearing the bad publicity and litigation that can arise from a charge 
of false arrest, will likely continue to avoid its use.105 
103. Temporary protective custody is not generally established in case law and, 
thus, lacks definitive, procedural protections. 
104. The explicit procedural protection required for temporary protective custody 
in the hostile-audience context should include limitation on the amount of time a 
speaker may be held pursuant to his removal by the police. Police custody, however, 
should be no longer than is reasonably necessary to effectuate escort from the con-
frontation and may include a brief "cooling" time to prevent an especially determined 
speaker from immediately returning to his former audience to renew the hostile con-
frontation. For example, The Uniform Arrest Act discussed at note 101 supra limits 
custody to 2 hours for suspicious persons held for questioning but not arrested or 
charged with 1\- crime. 
It would seem appropriate that the procedural protections for temporary protec-
tive custody should be significantly less than those attendant to arrest. Temporary 
protective custody, although effectuated by police, is unlike arrest because it does 
not involve the focusing of the criminal justice system on a particular individual 
which may result in severe infringements of liberty, ~ignificant social stigma, and 
the personal degredation stemming from being detained as an "officially" suspected 
criminal. 
105. See Miami Letter, supra note 39: "As to the use of 'Protective Custody' 
there seems to be no clear understanding as to the specifics involved therein. 
Consequently since for all practical purposes there is no clear delineation between 
'Protective Custody' and actual 'Arrest', the practice of protective custody is not used. 
Most Law Enforcement Officials we have talked with, feel that placing someone 
under protective custody in most circumstances is a certain invitation to a false arrest 
charge." But see Berkeley Letter, supra note 30: "Caution and judgment govern 
actions directed toward inciteful speakers: the use of powers of arrest or protective 
custody would depend exclusively on the attendant circumstances." The Berkeley 
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ill. SPEAKER REMEDIES FOR UNLAWFUL REMOVAL 
The proposed hostile-audience standard was devised to safeguard 
the first amendment rights of a speaker confronted by a belligerent 
crowd. Despite the specificity of the standard, however, police dis-
cretion is unavoidable, 106 and true protection of first amendment 
rights cannot prevail unless the police themselves appreciate the im-
portance of free speech. Conscientious implementation by police 
of the proposed standard will be promoted if there are effective reme-
dies available to speakers who have been unlawfully silenced and 
detained. This section of the Note assesses the limitations inherent 
in present remedies for false imprisonment and proposes reforms 
to make such remedies more effective. 
Currently the causes of action available to a speaker who has 
been unlawfully arrested in the hostile-audience context include the 
common-law tort actions of false imprisonment107 and malicious 
prosecution, 108 as well as monetary and injunctive relief against state 
officials provided by the federal Civil Rights Acts of 1871.100 
There is also an arguable cause of action for damages against federal 
officials based on a direct violation of first amendment rights. 110 
Police Department does not have formal procedures to deal with protective custody 
and hostile-audience speaker removal. 
106. See text at notes 39-40 supra. 
107. When there is a false arrest there is a false imprisonment, see Manos, Police 
Liability for False Arrest or Imprisonment, 16 CLBv.-MAR. L. RBv. 415 (1967); 
REsTATBMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 35 (1963). 
108. A malicious prosecution is a cause of action that is begun without probable 
cause that it will succeed and which finally ends in failure. See generally 52 AM, 
JUR. 2d, Malicious Prosecution § 4 (1970). 
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 entitled Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights reads: 
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of 
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress." The Federal Civil Rights Act of 1968 also has criminal 
provisions embodied in 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (1970), which authorizes federal prose-
cution of state officials or private persons who deprive an individual of constitutional 
rights. However, in practice, these provisions have been invoked only where the 
deprivation was brought about by violence and have never been used to redress denial 
of first amendm~nt rights. T. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 374. 
110. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), on re-
mand, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972), establishing a cause of action against federal 
officials comparable to that established against state officials under the Federal Civil 
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Bivens arose from an alleged violation of a 
person's fourth amendment rights by an illegal search and seizure by federal officials. 
The Supreme Court held that a cause of action for damages could be judicially cre• 
ated for a direct violation of the Constitution notwithstanding the lack of any legisla-
tive basis. Whether the scope of Bivens encompasses a violation of first amendment 
rights has not yet been definitely established. Limiting the Bivens rationale to viola-
tions of the fourth amendment seems unjustified. The lower federal courts are split 
on whether violations of first amendment rights create a cause of action. Cases 
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Finally, speakers may obtain immediate relief from improper con-
finement by filing writs of habeas corpus,111 although this remedy 
provides no damages.112 
The practical effectiveness of these remedies, however, is su-
stantially limited by two factors. First, the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity may preclude common-law tort actions against a govern-
mental unit.113 Although at least thirty states114 and the federal 
govemment115 have either totally or partially waived sovereign im-
munity, 116 its vestiges in many of these jurisdictions may still prevent 
finding a cause of action for damages include: Gardels v. Murphy, 377 F. Supp. 
1389, 1398 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Butler v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 1035, 1039-41 
(D. Hawaii 1973). See also State Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shulty, 498 F.2d 1146 
(4th Cir. 1974) (fifth amendment); United States ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 457 
F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1972) (fifth amendment); James v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 
1381 (D.R.!. 1973) (dicta, favoring expansive reading of Bivens). Cases where 
no cause of action was found include: Moore v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 163, 
165 (D. Colo. 1974); Smothers v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 351 F. Supp. 
622, 626 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 1972). See also Davidson v. Kane, 337 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. 
Va. 1972). 
111. Habeas corpus is a term applicable to several writs. However, as generally 
used it is the remedy provided for a person illegally deprived of liberty. See, e.g., 
Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611 (1961); Armstrong v. Vancil, 169 Ore. 320, 
128 P.2d 951 (1942). The writ is designed to effectuate speedy release from con-
finement and is essentially a writ of inquiry to test the right under which the person 
is detained. See, e.g., Ex parte McGuire, 135 Cal. 339, 67 P. 327 (1902); Porter 
v. Porter, 60 Fla. 407, 53 S. 546 (1910); Smith v. Henson, 298 Ky. 182, 182 S.W.2d 
666 (1944). See generally R. Sox:oL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS (2d ed. 1969). 
112. See Comment, Compensation of Persons Erroneously Confined by the State, 
118 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 1091, 1097 (1970): "Although the immediate problem of incar-
ceration is obviously ended by the prisoner's release, freedom from imprisonment 
is inadequate compensation and does not satisfy the government's liability. Release 
simply reverses the course of tragedy; it does nothing to repair the damage. The 
liability should be satisfied by monetary compensation." 
113. Justifications for municipal tort immunity include: the municipality derives 
no profit from exercise of government functions which are solely for the public bene-
fit; cities cannot carry on government functions if tax revenues must pay off employ-
ee's torts; and it is unreasonable to hold a city liable for negligence in the perform-
ance of duties dictated by the legislature and not assumed voluntarily by the munici-
pality. See Note, Municipality's Common Law Liability for Police Torts, 1973 
WASH. U. L.Q. 908 (1973). 
Select government authorities are granted privileges to ensure that they exercise 
their duties uninhibited by the fear of damage suits. In this way, duties will be 
performed in a "fearless, vigorous, and effective" manner. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 
564, 571 (1959). See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Booth v. Fletcher, 
101 F.2d 676, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 628 (1939). 
114. See Noel, Municipal Tort Immunity in Police Misconduct Litigation: The 
Case for Judicial Abrogation in Missouri, 18 ST. LoUis U. L.J. 602, 607 (1974). 
115. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (Supp. IV, 1974), 
amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1970) (partial waiver of tort immunity). 
116. See Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U. L. RE.v. 
1363, 1407-15 (1954). Legislatures may waive governmental immunity by enacting 
legislation with the following characteristics: Legislation creating a right to have 
the courts or another arm of government recommend to the legislature that it pass 
private relief bills on specific occasions or legislation delegating to an admin,istrative 
agency the duty to hear claims. Typically, either type of legislation takes one of 
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relief to a speaker whose speech has been unlawfully terminated.117 
For example the Federal Torts Claims Act118 waives immunity only 
for conduct of federal government agents that would be actionable 
if done by a private individual. Thus, a person whose speech rights 
have been abridged not only must prove that the termination of his 
speech was unlawful and was proximately caused by the police, but 
also must often make highly artificial analogies of private tort claims 
to acts peculiar to government, such as the power to arrest and 
imprison.119 Of course in those states retaining full immunity, com-
mon-law actions against governmental units or their agents are, for 
all practical purposes, barred.120 
Although actions against the state itself appear to be precluded, 
the sovereign immunity defense for state and federal law enforce-
ment officials may be overcome in actions brought under the federal 
civil rights law121 and in tort claims based on the violation of a 
constitutional right,122 respectively. However, courts realize that 
the police officer may be in the difficult position of having to choose 
between a possible charge of dereliction of duty if he does not arrest 
or being mulcted for damages if he does. They have therefore held 
that both state123 and federal124 officers accused of constitutional 
violations may use as a defense a good faith belief that their conduct 
was lawful and a reasonable belief in the validity of the laws under 
two forms: (a) It may be a device to avoid state constitutional provisions proscrib-
ing suits against the state, or (b) it may result in an actual exercise of legislative 
discretion in making awards in response to judicial or agency recommendations. 2 
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS, n.3 (1956). 
111. See Comment, supra note 112, at 1099-104. 
118. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-
2680 (1970). 
119. See Comment, supra note 112, at 1096-97. 
120. Although causes of action in tort are sustainable where a government official 
acts outside the scope of official authority4 such suits are very difficult to prove 
because "scope of authority" is not well defined and is usually broadly construed. 
See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949); Byse, 
Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, 
Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 15 HARv. L. REV. 1479 (1962). 
It may be possible to extend the Bivens rationale (see note 110 supra) to a 
suit commenced against a state or a municipality. It would seem unreasonable to 
allow the common-law concept of sovereign immunity to preclude mechanically an 
action in damages against the state or municipality for a violation of an explicit con-
stitutional provision. See Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitlltion as a 
Sword, 85 HARV. L REv. 1532, 1556 (1972). 
121. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 
122. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), on remand, 
456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972). 
123. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (state officers). 
124. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), on remand, 
456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972) (federal officers). 
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which the arrest was made. This defense, involving the so-called 
"moral aspects of the case,"125 is very difficult to overcome. 
It is never easy to prove that a police officer was derelict in his 
duty, especially in a jury trial in which jurors, as average members 
of the community, are likely to be much more sensitive to the need 
for law and order than to the need for open, robust debate. This 
general problem may be compounded by the commonly held feelings 
that a person who publicly makes provocative statements is assum-
ing the risk of being confronted and subsequently stopped from 
speaking. Moreover, if the speaker holds views that are generally 
unpopular in the community, the jury is likely to reflect this bias 
and depreciate the value of his rights. At the outset, such attitudes 
render a favorable verdict for. such a speaker extremely difficult 
to obtain, notwithstanding the legal merits of his claim. 
Even if the speaker receives a favorable verdict, these same 
attitudes may affect the extent of his recovery. In proving damages, 
the speaker would likely be able to show only nominal actual damages 
for his short incarceration. To make his lawsuit sufficiently re-
munerative, the speaker would therefore also have to establish in-
juries stemming from the violation of his first amendment rights and 
from loss of reputation. Unfortunately, the valuation of the abridg-
ment -of first amendment rights, though admissible as proof of dam-
ages, 126 is speculative,127 and those persons most likely to be abused 
by improper police conduct in a hostile-audience situation typically 
do not have the status or reputation that a jury would consider 
worthy of protection.128 In fact, many juries and judges might per-
ceive that the reputations ·of certain dissidents have actually been 
enhanced by oppressive police procedures. A likely consequence 
of this bias against speakers is that many attorneys will be dissuaded 
from taking on a case that may incur the displeasure of the police 
125. This phrase was coined in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886), where 
the Court, in commenting that a defendant had redress against a police officer for 
false imprisonment, stated: "Whether [the plaintiff] could recover a sum sufficient 
to justify the action would probably depend upon moral aspects of the case, which 
we cannot here consider." 
126. Hague v. CIO, 101 F.2d 744 (3d Cir.), modified, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
127. See Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 
MINN. L. R.Ev. 493,512 (1955). 
128. See Foote, supra note 127, at 500. Butcher v. Adams, 310 Ky. 205, 220 
S.W.2d 398 (1949), provides a vivid example of the sometimes unfortunate conse-
quences of the reparations system. In this case, a judgment for the defendant was 
affirmed despite evidence disclosing that as a matter of law there had been a false 
arrest and a false imprisonment. The court explained that although the plaintiff 
should have received a directed verdict, reversal was inappropriate since there could 
be no significant damages. It reasoned that the plaintiff, having a criminal record, 
could not have been humiliated by the arrest. This opinion also highlights the disad-
vantages of a criminal record. See notes 90-92 supra. See also Cardello v. Double-
day & Co., 518 F.2d 638 (2nd Cir. 1975). 
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while offering only a small potential recovery.120 Thus, while the 
proposed hostile-audience standard can resolve some of the diffi-
culties associated with proving a breach of the police duty to pro-
tect a speaker's first amendment rights, the problem remains that 
damages will often be insufficient either to encourage speakers to 
maintain a cause of action or to deter police abuse. 
This situation may be remedied by replacing the current process 
of the determination of damages at trial with a statutory provision 
for liquidated damages. Such a use of liquidated damages to 
encourage private enforcement of statutory violations is not a 
novel device in our legal system. Liquidated damages currently 
provide incentives for actions against public officers130 and for 
several types of consumer actions131 where the individual's de-
monstrable damages are insubstantial but where broad deterrence 
of certain conduct is deemed necessary. 
It must be conceded that there are strong arguments that weigh 
against general exposure of the police to substantial liability for 
performance of their duties. Such liability' may not only inhibit 
law enforcement officials from protecting legitimate state interests 
but may also discourage some persons from entering public service. 
In the hostile-audience context, however, the standard proposed by 
this Note provides explicit guidelines for measuring the propriety 
of police conduct. Adherence to this standard, coupled with invo-
cation of the general defenses available to police officers in tort 
actions, 132 should immunize those officers who execute their duties 
in good fai~. 
Thus, while the dangers inherent in the remedy can be minimized, 
its advantages in terms of protecting free speech are considerable. 
Removing the necessity of showing harm to reputation would, for 
instance, reduce the danger that evidence on this issue might in-
fluence the jury's determination concerning fault.133 Additionally, 
use of the proposed remedy could provide some inducement for 
attorneys to litigate cases for persons deprived of their free speech 
129. See Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. REV, 
1182 (1952). Cf. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN, 
L. REV. 349, 429-30 (1974). 
130. E.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 33-147 (1974) (if any officer takes greater fees 
than allowed, "he shall forfeit and pay the sum of fifty dollars to the party injured"); 
Foote, supra note 127, at 496. 
131. See Note, Federal Preemption of State Law: The Example of Overbooking 
in the Airline Industry, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1200, 1201-02 (1976) (liquidated damage 
remedy for passengers "bumped" by airlines); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CooE § 9-
507(1) (minimum recovery for secured party's failure to comply with part 5 of 
article 9 if collateral is consumer goods). 
132. See text at note 123 supra. 
133. See text at notes 125-26 supra. 
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rights.134 Most importantly, the use of liquidated damages, rather 
than damages determined by compensation hearings135 or by juries, 
is essential if the speaker is to be compensated not merely for actual 
pecuniary loss but also for difficult-to-prove deprivation of first 
amendment rights, and if police abuse is to be deterred.136 These 
benefits warrant serious consideration by legislators of provisions 
for liquidated damages in tort actions where there is a breach by the 
police of a duty to protect fitst amendment rights in the hostile-
audience context. 
Even if the suggestions for the use of temporary protective cus-
tody and liquidated damages are not adopted, the proposed hostile-
audience standard will still provide a constitutional framework within 
which police may resolve the inherent conflict between society's 
legitimate interest in maintaining order and the speaker's constitu-
tionally protected right to free speech. Under a standard that re-
quires the police to exert all reasonable efforts against the hostile 
crowd and that delineates specific action that must be taken before 
speech can be silenced, police discretion in preventing riots and in 
protecting human life may, after all, be made compatible with the 
most fundamental of constitutional rights. 
134. One federal Commission recommended "that Congress consider amending 
section 1983 to provide that in all cases brought under this Section-actions for 
injunctions, as well as damages--the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing 
party reasonable attorney's fees as part of the costs." UNITED STATES COMMISSION 
ON CML RIGHTS, LAW ENFORCEMENT, A REPORT ON EQUAL PROTECITON IN TIIB 
Soum, 179, 180 (1965). 
135. See 28 U.S.C. § 2513 (1970). 
136. It has been argued that to induce a truly systemic change in law enforce-
ment practices a cause of action should be created against municipalities and the 
state utilizing the Bivens rationale. Dellinger, supra note 120. 
